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·No. 75-5706 - Proffitt v. Florida 
In 1972, immediately after the Court's decision in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, the Florida legisiature passed 
· new statutes providing for the occasions and the procedures 
for the imposition of the death penalty. The statutes provide 
1/ 
that certain felonies, including first degree murder,- con-
stitute "capital felonies," which are punishable by life im-
prisonment unless it is determined in the special punishment 
2/ 
proceeding that the offender shall be punished by death.-
1/ The murder statute under which petitioner was convicted reads 
as follows: 
~/ 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 (1973) 
Murder 
"( 1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being 
when perpetrated from a premeditated design to 
effect the death of the person killed or any hum~n 
being. or when committed by a person engaged m 
the perpetration of, or in the attempt to 
perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, 
kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful 
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive 
device or bomb, or which resulted from the 
unlawful distribution of heroin by a person over 
the age of seventeen years when such drug is 
proven to be the proximate cause of the death of 
the user, shall be murder in the first degree and 
shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as 
provided in § 775.082. 
(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure 
set forth in section 921.141 shall be followed in 
orcter to determine sentence of death or life 
imprisonment. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.082 (1973) 
Penalties for felonies and misdemeanors 
"( 1) A person who has been convicted of a capital 
felony shall be -punished by life imprisonment and 
shall be required to serve no less than twenty-five 
(25) calendar years before becoming eligible for 
parole unless the proceeding held to determine 
sentence accordjng to the procedure set forth in 
section 921.141 results in findings by the Court . 
that such person shall be punished by death, and 
in the latter event such person shall be punished 
by death. '' 
.l 
The proceeding which determines whether or not the death 
penalty should be imposed is held after the defendant has been 
3/ 
convicted of the capital felony.- This separate proceeding is 
conducted by the trial judge before the same jury which de-
4/ 
termined the defendant's guilt.- Evidence may be presented on 
any matter the judge deems relevant to sentences and must include 
matters relating to certain legislatively specified aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances. Both the state and the· defense 
may present argument on whether the death penalty shall be im-
posed. 
After the evidence and argument have been presented, the 
jury must decide whether or not it will recommend that the death 
penalty be imposed. In deliberating on this question, the jury 
is to follow what is essentially a three stage process. First, 
it must decide whether there exist sufficient statutory aggravating 
5/ 
circumstances to justify imposing the death penalty.- The jury 
ll Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (1973). 
4/ Either the trial jury or the punishment jury, or both, may 
be waived by the defendant. 
5/ The aggravating and mitigating circumstances are set out in 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (5) and (6) (1973): 
'' (5) Aggravating circumstances. -Aggravating cir-
cumstances shall be limited to the following: 
(a) The capital felony was committed by a 
person under sentence of imprisonment. 
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of 
another capital felony or of a felony involving the 
use or threat of violence to the person. 
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk 
of death to many persons. 
(d) The capital felony was committed while the 
defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, any 
robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or 
aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, 
or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. 
(e) The capital felony was committed for the 
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest 
or effecting an escape from custody. 






must then decide whether there are sufficient mitigating cir-
cumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. And 
finally, based on these considerations, the jury must decide 
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life 
--------
imprisonment. When a majority of the jury has agreed, the 
jury's advisory verdict is returned. 
The Court is not bound by the jury's verdict. It must 
itself weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and 
decide what sentence it will impose. If the Court imposes a 
sentence of death, it must make specific written findings con-
cerning the sufficient aggravating circumstanc.es and the in- · 
sufficient mitigating circumstances. 
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death is subject 
6/ 
to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida.- This 
review is intended to ensure that the decision between death and 
life imprisonment is made rationally, not arbitrarily. As the 
5/ (Continued) 
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt 
or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental 
function or the enforcement of laws. 
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel. 
(6) Mitigating circumstances. - Mitigating circum-
stances shall be the following: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of 
prior criminal activity. 
(b) The capital felony was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance. 
(c) The victim was a participant in the 
defendant's conduct or consented to the act. 
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the 
capital felony committed by another person and 
his participation was relatively minor. 
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress 
or under the substantial domination of another 
person. 
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of Jaw was substan-
tially impaired. 
(g) The age of the defendant, at the time of the 
crime." · 
§_/ F 1 a . Stat . Ann . § 9 21. 141 ( 4 ) ( 19 7 3 ) . 
- 3 -
Supreme Court of Florida said in State v. Dixon, Fla. 
283 So. 2d 1, 10 (1973), "Review by this Court guarantees that 
the reasons present in one cas~ will reach a similar result to 
that reached under similar circumstances in another case . . . . 
If a defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that 
case in light of the other decisions and determine whether or 
not the punishment is too great." 
It was under this statute that petitioner was tried, found 
guilty and sentenced to death for the first degree murder of Joel 
Ronnie Medgebow. The circumstances surrounding the murder itself. 
were testified to by Patricia Medgebow, the decedent's wife, 
. 7/ 
who was present at the time of the murder.- She , and her husband 
had gone to sleep in the bedroom of their apartment, but Mrs. 
Medgebow had wakened several times during the night. She wakened 
again around 5:00 a.m. to find her husband sitting . up in bed, 
moaning. He was holding what she took to be a ruler. Just then a 
third person jumped up and hit her several times in the face, 
knocking her to the floor. The intruder then ran out through 
. 
the living room. Mrs. Medgebow was . not able to identify the 
attacker, although she was able to give a description of his 
~/ 
clothing. After the intruder left, Mrs. Medgebow turned on the 
light and saw that her husband had been stabbed. sh·e attempted 
to give him artificial respiration and cardiac massage, then ran 
across the hall and wakened a neighbor. Later the police and an 
ambulance were called. 
ll The murder occurred on July 10, 1973. 
8/ She described the attacker as wearing light pants and a 
p1n stripe shirt with long sleeves rolled up to the elbow. She 




The post-mortem examination showed that Medgebow had been 
killed by a single stab wound into the heart, causing shock 
and compression of the heart as . the pericardium filled with 
blood. 
Petitioner was connected to the crime as a result of a 
telephone call to the police made by his wife later in the 
morning of July 10. She testified that on the night before the 
short-sleeved 
murder, petitioner had gone to work dressed in a/White shirt, 
with his company's name on it, and gray pants. He returned 
at about 5:15 a.m. dressed in the same shirt and pants but 
with no shoes. Petitioner had some conversation with his wife 
at this time, packed his clothes and left. He was later arrested 
in Connecticut. 
A young woman, _Mary Bassett, and her infant daughter were 
boarding with the Bassetts. From her bedroom, Mrs. Bassett over-
heard parts of petitioner's conversation with his wife. She 
testified that petitioner said .he had stabbed and killed a man 
with a butcher knife while he was burglarizing a place, and that 
he had beaten a woman. 
Small amounts of human blood were found on the petitioner's 
Maas Brothers shirt, but the quantity was too small to type. 
No fingerprints were found on the murder weapon. 
-. 
A co-worker of petitioner testified that they had been drinking 
together until 3:30 or 3:45a.m., that petitioner had driven him 
horne, had conversed with him briefly, and left. Petitioner at 
this time was wearing the same gray pants and white shirt he wore 
. back to his mobile horne at 5:15. 
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. During the 
punishment phase of the ?ifurcated proceeding, it was shown that 
the defendant had one prior conviction, a 1967 charge of breaking 
and entering without permission. The State also introduced the 
- . 5-
-s!..' '- ~ 
---------c,;,-\;7. ' ;;;~~---, o cr-----------------------.-----------~ 
evidence of Dr. James Crumbley, the doctor at the jail 
where petitioner was held pending trial. Dr. Crumbley 
testified that petitioner had come to him as a physician, and 
told him that he (the petitioner) was concerned that he would 
do--damage_ to other people in the future, that he had had an 
uncontrollable desire to kill which had resulted in his killing 
one man, that he could feel this desire building up again, and 
that he wanted the doctor to get him some psychiatric help so 
he would not kill again~ The doctor also testified that in 
his opinion the petitioner was dangerous and would be a danger 
to his fellow inmates if imprisoned, but petitioner's condition 
could be treated so that he would no longer be dangerous. 
Dr. Crumbley also testified that in his opinion the petitioner 
was under an extreme mental disturbance at the time the crime 
was committed. 
The jury returned an advisory verdict recommending that 
the sentence of death be imposed. The judge ordered an inde-
pendent psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, the results of 
which indicated that the petitioner was not, then or at the 
time of the murder, mentally impaired. The trial judge then 
sentenced petitioner to death. In his written findings in 
support of the sentence, the judge found as aggravating circum-
stances (1) that the murder was premeditated and occurred in the 
course of a felony (burglary); (2) that the petitioner has the 
propensity to commit murder; (3) that the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and (4) that the defendant knowingly 
through his intentional act created a great risk of serious 
bodily harm and death to many persons. The trial judge also 
specifically found that none of the enumerated mitigating cir-
cumstances existed in this case. The Supreme Court of Florida 





April 1, 1976 
No. 75-5706 PROFFITT v. FLORIDA 
Capital Case - The Florida Statute 
The Florida statute like the federal and Texas statutes, 
authorizes capital punishment only after consideration of both 
"aggravating" and "mitigating" circumstances. But the Florida 
system is not as carefully structured. It allows the jury to 
"balance" factors on both sides and permits a recommendation 
of death even when there is a "mitigating" factor. 
The bifurcated system operates with the same judge and 
jury. Any relevant evidence, even if otherwise inadmissible, 
may be introduced during the sentencing phase. The jury may 
consider eight "aggravating" and seven "mitigating" circum-
stances similar to those found in Texas. 
The jury must decide (i) whether there are sufficient 
aggravating circumstances, (ii) whether there are sufficient 
mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances; and (iii) whether life imprisonment or death is the 
appropriate sentence. 
The jury may recommend, but the decision as to sentencing 
is left to the judge. 
As pointed out in State v. Dixon (283 So. 2d 1) (the 
first decision by the Supreme Court of Florida under the 




"The fourth step required by Fla. Stat. § 921.141, 
F.S.A., is that the trial judge justifies his 
sentence of death in writing, to provide the 
opportunity for meaningful review by this Court. 
Discrimination or capriciousness cannot stand where 
reason is required, and this is an important element 
added for the protection of the convicted defendant. 
Not only is the sentence then open to judicial review 
and correction, but the trial judge is required to 
view the issue of life or death within the framework 
of rules provided by the statute." 283 So. 2d 1 at 8. 
In Dixon, addressing whether the death sentence would 
2. 
be imposed in one situation and not in another, the Court said: 
" •.. Review by this Court guarantees that the 
reasons present in one case will reach a similar 
result to that reached under similar circumstances 
in another case. No longer will one man die and 
another live on the basis of race, or a woman live 
and a man die on the basis of sex. If a defendant 
is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case 
in light of the other decisions and determine whether 
or not the punishment is too great." 283 So. 2d at 10. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~ttpTtUU Qfltltrl ttf t!rt 'Jlttittb _ihtttg 
jira.alp:ttghm. ~. '!f. 2ll&f'!~ 
Re: No. 75-5706 - Proffitt v. Florida 
Dear Byron: 
June 29, 1976 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. : Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
'- Mr. Justice Stew:.J.rt 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justi.ce Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Rrom: Mr.. Justice Blackmun 
C1rc~lated: C.,/:J9jZ6 
· No. 75-5706 - Proffitt ·v. Florida Recirculated: __________ _ 
/ 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring. 
I concur in the result. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 405-414 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and id., at 375, 
414 and 465. 
----~~-----------------~-------------------------~~~-~· 
J 
• This case, here on certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of Florida, presents the challenge to the capital punish-
ment statute of that state. 
As the Justices who have preceded me({ave stated, 
,) 
~ 
the threshold question - the fundamental one - presented 
__.. ... ----..,-... ,..-...... .... 
in all five of these cases is as follows: 
......---., 
Whether the punishment of death for the 
crime of_murder/is,/under all circumstances,/ 
"cruel and unusual" in violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution? 
If we had answered this question in the affirmative, 
it would be unnecessary to consider the statutes and 
procedures in the five states. /].s has ~dicated;] · 
~ .s;even members of the Court Ferconcl~that 
capital punishment is ~ unconstitutional per ~· 
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Chief Justice 
and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, has summarized his reasons for 
agreeing with this conclusion. 
I now speak for Justices Stewart, Stevens and myself. 
~n our joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, p. 11-30, we 
~:a~e ....t;.he.-recmons.:-re.-~en iR tnis ~· 
~t:v ~~ ~,._. ~_/~4f-l'~ i 







We i?corporate ~y re~~enc"§ :~he;e reason~ in the joint 
opinions filed by the three of ~n !ac~ of the other 
four cases. 
The precedents of this Court~extending over many 
• ~ I , 
years, .· establish guiding principles: ~e Eighth Amendment 
I '\ .- -------~ 
is ~t a static concept./'rl¥~draws its meaning from/('the 
evolvlng standards of d:cency
1
1that mark the progress of a 
maturing society". A penalty must not involve the 
unnecessary/ 'nd wanton / infliction of pain. Nor can it be 
I 
substantially out of proportion to the severity of the 
crime. As long as the penalty specified by the legislature 
comports with these criteria, we must defer to the judgment 
~ri-c.,~ 
of the elected representatives of the people~ 
/~ ·~. 
No one can doubt that the death penalty was 
contemplated~when the Constitutio~ was adopted. It was 
a traditional penaltll'both in the colonies and in England. 
The text of the Fifth Amendment, reiterated in part in 
the Fourteenth Amendm~~,P~~~~~he acceptance of 
capital punishment. And, in the nearly two centuries of 
our national existence~until 1972-~this Court -
repeatedli,~nd often expressly, j recognized that capital 
punishment is not invalid per se. 
In Trop v. Dulles, 19~~ Chief Justice Warren - in 
~-
the same opinion in which he spoke of "evolving standards 
of decency" - noted: 
" .•. the death penalty has been emP,loyed 
throughout our history, 'd in a day,fwhen it 
is still widely accepted, it cannot~e said 
to violate the constitutional concept of 
cruelty." 
The first major challenge to the per se validity of 
capital punishment reached this Court in 1972 in Furman 
I .: {-"'d#. ,;;}'~(_ 
v. Georgia. !As Mr. Justice Stewart has indicated,r although 
/~ 
the issue was there strongly presented, it was not resolved 
' . 
by the Court. Four Justices would have held that capital 
' . 
punishment is not invalid; two would have reached the 
opposite conclusion; and three Justices, while agreeing. 
that the statutes then before the Court were invalid as 
·applied, left . open the question whether such punishment 
may ever be imposed. "·; 
,..... 
The principal argument~resented by petitioners in 
FurmanJ'as that standards of decency had evolved to the 
poin~where capital punishment was no longer tolerated. 
It was said then/that the Eighth Amendment must be 
construed finallyJ'as prohibiting capital punishment for 






L ~-- ~~>-~t 
. Petitioners in the five ~s"\'day /renewed the 
"standard of decency argument". ButAdevelopments during 
the four years since Furman have undercut substantially~ 
the assumptions upon which that argument was advanced . 
Objective criteria demonstrate;lhat prevailing 
standards in our countr~do not reject capital punishment, 
at least as a sanction in some cases. 
The most marked indicatio~f society's endorsement 
of the death penalty for ~e~s the legislative response 
to Furman. The legislatures of ~t least 35 states,J'and 
the Congress of the United States/have enacted new statutes 
that provide for this penalty - at least for some murders. 
The jurylalso is a reliable objective index of ~~~ • .'
1 -.;~ ~ ~~~--...,.~
contemporary valu;;;,~,.ej~is .,. ~ifeCCi.f -involved, ~ 
Since Furman,jand under the new statutesy'juries have ~~ 
imposed the death penalty in more than 400 cases. 
But the Eighth Amendment demands more;{han a finding 
that a challenged punishment~is acceptable to contemporary 
society. As noted above, a penalty may not be substantially 
out of proportio;/to the severity of the crime;jnor may 










We cannot say that the infliction of deathj'as a 
punishment for murde;lis without justification. In part, 
capital punishment is an expression of society's belief~ 
that certain crimes are so grievo~an affront to humanity// 
that the ~adequate r~medy;{s the penalty of death. 
In part,;tapital punishment also reflects a legis-
lative judgment;{hat the sanction is necessary to deter 
capital crimes. There is no concl~e empiric data~ 
either proving or disprovin~the value of the penalty as 
a deterrent. We may assume that there are murders,/such 
0 -
as those committed in the heat of passion,jfor which the 
threat of deat~has little or no deterrent effect. But 
there are others;(e·&·, those that are deliberately planned 
in advarice,jwhere the penalty may_ well~;la deterring 
factor. And, in some cases - such as murder by a life 
prisoner - there is no other adequate sanction. 
The evaluation of the unresolved debate concerning 
deterrence/properly rests with the legislatures. They ~~-
~ C4jl6<~ ~ ~~ 
have a flexibilit~and,a~~h~unavailable to the · ~ 
judiciary. 
It is well to remember/that we are concerned in 
these case;l~nl4 with the imposition of capital punishment 
~/-t.Jc_ ~ ~ 
~-
for ~he crime of murder. 
We conclude/when a life has been taken deliberatel~ 
that the punishment of deat~is ~t invariably disproportionate 
to that crime. It is an extreme s:~tion,/suitablejfor the 
most extreme of crimes. 
* * * * 
I come now, briefly, to the Florida case. I will 
not state the facts;'beyond saying that petitioner - in 
the course of an unlawful entry into a home at night -
stabbed to death his sleeping victim- and beat the victim's 
wife~The Florida statute, in all material respects/provides 
the same safeguards as the Georgia statut,ldescribed b~ Mr. 
Justice Stewart. 
There is a bifurcated procedure. After the jury 
found petitioner guilty, a separate hearing was hel~to 
determine whether the sentence should be death;br life 
imprisonment. The Florida statute requires consideration 
I 
of specified aggravatingj and mitigating circumstances. 
Acting in light of these,J'the jury recommended the sentence 
of death. The trial judge then imposed that sentence, 
identifying in writing four of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances. 
Again as in Georgia, automatic review by the Florida 
















For reasons more fully stated in our op~n~on, we 
conclude that these safeguard~provide the procedural 
protection/that prevent the "wanton" and "freakish" 
t-1 ~.~.....t.~ 
imposition of capital punishmen7 that weA~ unconstitu-
tional in Furman v. Georgia. 
~ 
~;rding·ly )we"'8ffit!tF th -:fudgment ·uf· the .Supreme 




/'ltrv :J.., ;J ~ ... ~~~~~-v ct.- :lt4 ;J.- fit,'~,_, r;11 t.f 
~ /-cJ!,uQ d::~ . ..,>"JI(;-#j'W-Ij ~If . ., , . 
------ --
~------~---~-~--------...~-~--IYl ·. J'lD :co Stewart 
M.r . J u:-:J t ice 1Ia·"sh1.ll 
Mr. Junt~ce Bl1.ckmun 







From: Mr. Justice White 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATJt§rcula ted: 
------
No. 75- 5706 Recircu:Lttrd: 6 - ... 7lt:!l 
Charles William Proffitt, l 
Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. Supreme Court of Florida. 
State of Florida. 
[June - , 1976] 
, MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHJEF JusTIC!I I 
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the 
judgment. 
There is no need to repeat the statement of the facts 
of this case and of the statutory procedure under which 
the death penalty was imposed, both of which are de-
scribed in detail in the opinion of MR. JusTICE STEWART, l 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, and MR. JusTICE STEVENS (here-
inafter the plurality). I agree with the plurality, see 
Part 2 (a) and (b), ante, at-, that although the stat-
utory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are not 
susceptible to mechanical application they are by no 
means so vague and overbroad as to leave the discretion 
of the sentencing authority unfettered. Under Florida 
law, the sentencing judge is required to impose the death 
penalty on all first-degree murderers as to whom the 
statutory aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors. There is good reason to anticipate, then , that 
as to certain categories of murderers, the penalty will not 
be imposed freakishly or rarely but will be imposed with 
regularity; and consequently it cannot be said that the 
death penalty in Florida as to those categories has 
peased "to be a credible deterrent or measurably to con-
tribute to any other end of punishment in the crimiqal 
justice system." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 311 
r 
, . . !\ 
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. (concurring opinion). Accordingly, the Florida statu-
tory scheme for imposing the death penalty does not run 
afoul of this Court's holding in Furman v. Georgia, supra .. , 
For the reasons set forth in my concurriQg opinion in 
Gregg v. Georgia, ante, at -, this conclusion is rot 
undercut by the possibility that some murderers may' 
escape the death penalty solely through exercise of prose- . 
cutorial discretipn or executive clemency. For the r~a­
sons set forth ·in my dissenting opinion in Roberts v. 
Louisiana, pqst, at -, I also reject petitioner's argu-
ment that under the Eighth Amendment the death pen..-) 
alty may never pe imposed under ltllY circumstances. .. 
l concur in the iudgment of affirmance,. 
.§u:pt"ttttt Qfou.rt of tqt 'Jllttittb ~tatts 
Jfasqmghm. ~. ar. 211,?'!-~ 
CHAMBE RS O F 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Chief, 
June 30, 1976 
Can the Confer'ence tomorrow be at 2:30p.m. 
instead of 2:00p.m.? I have a luncheon engagement 
that will make it difficult for me to be back in the build-
ing before 2:30p.m. 
Sincerely yours, 
<'s 
\ I ( 
/ 
The Chief Justice 






















Charles W~l~iam Proffitt,] . . B&u 
Petitioner, On Wnt of Certwran to the 
v. Supreme Court of Florida. 
State of Florida. 
[July 2, 1976] 
Opinion of MR. JusTICE STEWART, MR. JusTICE PowELL, 
and MR. JusTICE STE;VENS announcing the judgment of 
the Court, delivered by MR. JusTICE PowELL. 
The issue presented by this case is whether the imposi-
tion of the sentence of death for the crim~ of murder 
under the law of Florida violates the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 
I 
The petitioner, Charles William Proffitt, was tried, 
found guilty, and sentenced to death for the first-degree 
murder of Joel Medgebow. The circumstances surround-
ing the murder were testified to by the decedent's wife, 
who was present at the time it was committed. On 
July 10, 1973, Mrs. Medgebow awakened around 5 a. m. 
in the bedroom of her apartment to find her husband 
sitting up in bed, moaning. He was holding what she 
took to be a ruler.1 Just then a third person jumped 
up, hit her several times with his fist, knocked her to 
the floor, and ran out of the house. It soon appeared 
that Medgebow had been fatally stabbed with a butcher 
knife. Mrs. Medgebow was not able to identify the at-
1 It appears that the "ruler" was actually the murder weapon 
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tacker, although she was able to give a description of 
him.2 
The petitioner's wife testified that on the night before 
the murder the petitioner had gone to work dressed in 
a white shirt and gray pants, and that he had returned 
at about 5: 15 a. m. dressed in the same clothing but 
without shoes. She said that after a short conversa-
tion the petitioner had packed his clothes and departed. 
A young woman boarder, who overheard p~trts of the 
petitioner's conversation with his wife, testified that the 
petitioner had told his wife that he had stabbed and 
killed a man with a butcher knife while he was burglar-
izing a place, and that he had beaten a woman. One 
of the petitioner's coworkers testified that they had been 
drinking together until 3:30 or 3:45 a. m. on the morn-
ing of the murder and that the petitioner had then 
driven him home. He said that the petitioner at this 
time was wearing gray pants and a white shirt. 
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. Sub-
sequently, as provided by Florida law, a sepa.rate hearing 
was held to determine whether the petitioner should be 
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. Under the 
state law that decision turned on whether certain statu-
tory aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime 
outweighed any statutory mitigating circumstances found 
to exist.3 At that hearing it was shown that the peti-
tioner had one prior conviction, a 1967 charge of breaking 
and entering. The State also introduced the testimony 
of the physician at the jail where the petitioner had been 
held pending trial, Dr. Crumbley. He testified that the 
petitioner had come to him as a physician, and told him 
that he was concerned that he would harm other people 
2 She described the attacker as wearing light pants and a pin-
striped shirt w1th long sleeves rolled up to the elbow. She also 
stated that the attacker was a medium-sized white ma~e. 
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in the future, that he had had an uncontrollable desire 
to kill that had already resulted in his killing one man, 
that this desire was building up again, and that he 
wanted psychiatric help so he would not kill again. Dr. 
Crumbley also testified that, in his opinion, the petitioner 
was dangerous and would be a danger to his fellow 
inmates if imprisoned, but that his condition could be 
treated successfully. 
The jury returned an advisory verdict recommending 
the sentence of death. The trial judge ordered an in-
dependent psychiatric evaluation of the petitioner, the 
results of which indicated that the petitioner was not, 
then or at the time of the murder, mentally impaired. 
The judge then sentenced the petitioner to death . In 
his written findings supporting the sentence, the judge 
found as aggravating circumstances that ( 1) the murder 
was premeditated and occurred in the course of a felony 
(burglary); (2) the petitioner has the propensity to 
commit murder; (3) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, and cruel; and ( 4) the petitioner knowingly, 
through his intentional act, created a great risk of serious 
bodily harm &nd death to mltny persons. The jud~e 
also found specifica.lly that none of the statutory miti-
gating circumstances existed. The Supreme Court of 
Floridlt affirmed. Proffitt v. State, 315 So.. 2d 461 
(1975). We granted certiorari, - U. S. -, to con-
sider whether the imposition of the death sentence in 
this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
II 
The petitioner argues that the imposition of the death 
penalty under any circumstances is cruel and unt.Jsual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. We reject this argument for the reasons 
stated today in Gregg v. Geor(Jia, ante, pp. 11- 30. 
4 
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A 
In response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 
( 1972), the Florida Legislature adopted new statutes that 
authorize the imposition of the death penalty on those 
convicted of first-degree murder. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 
(1) (Supp. 197&-1977) .4 At the same time Florida 
adopted a new capital-sentencing procedure, patterned 
in large part on the Model Penal Code. See § 921.141 
(Supp. 197&-1977) .5 Under the new statute, if a defend-
ant is found guilty of a capital offense, a separate evi-
dentiary hearing is held before the trial judge and jury 
to determine his sentence. Evidence may be presented 
on any matter the judge deems relevant to sentencing 
4 The murder statute under which petitioner was convicted reads 
as follows: 
"(1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated 
from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed 
or any human being, or when committed by a person engaged in 
the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, 
involuntary sexual battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft 
piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive 
device or bomb, or which resulted from the unlawful distribution of 
heroin by a person 18 years of age or older when such drug is 
proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user, shall be 
murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony, 
punishable as provided in s. 775.082. 
"(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in 
s. 921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death 
or life imprisonment." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 (Supp. 1976-1977) . 
Another Florida statute authorizes imposition of the death penalty 
upon conviction of sexual battery of a child under 12 years of 
age. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.011 (2) (Supp. 1976--1977) . We do not 
in this opinion consider the constitutionality of the death penalty 
for any offense other than first-degree murder. 
5 Compare Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 
1962) (set out in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. 36 n. 42). 
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and must include matters relating to certain legislatively 
specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
Both the prosecution and the defense may present argu~ 
ment on whether the death penalty shall be imposed. 
At the conclusion of the hearing the jury is directed 
to consider " [ w] hether sufficient mitigating circumstances 
exist . . . which outweigh aggravating circumstances 
found to exist; and .. . fb] ased on those considerations, 
whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [im· 
prisonment] or death." §§ 921.141 (2)(b)-(c) (Supp. 
1976-1977).6 The jury's verdict is determined by ma-
6 The aggravating circumstances are: 
'
1 (a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence 
of imprisonment. 
"(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital 
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the 
person. 
" (c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many 
persons. 
"(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was 
engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt 
to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or air~ 
craft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a 
destructive device or bomb. 
"(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding 
or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. 
"(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. 
"(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the 
lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement 
of laws. 
"(h) The capital felony was especia.lly heinous, atrocious, or cruel.'' 
The mitigating circumstances are: 
"(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal 
activity. 
"(b) The capita.! felony was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
[Footnote 6 is continued on p. 6] 
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jority vote. It is only advisory; the actual sentence is 
determined by the trial judge. The Florida Supreme 
Court has stated, however, that "[i]n order to sustain a 
sentence of death following a jury recommendation of 
life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be 
so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable per-
son could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 
(1975). Accord, Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1, 5 
(1976). Cf. Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666, 671 
( 1975) .7 
The trial judge is also directed to weigh the statutory 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances when he de-
termines the sentence to be imposed on a defendant. 
The statute requires that if the trial court imposes a 
sentence of death, "it shall set forth in writing its findings 
upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts: 
(a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating circum-
stances exist . . . and (b) [ t] hat there are insufficient 
·''(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or 
consented to the act. 
'
1 (d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony com-
mitted by another person and his participation was relatively 
minor. 
"·(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the sub-
stantial domination of another person. 
"(f) The capacity of the deft>ndant to appreciate the crimmality 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was substantially impaired. 
"(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime." § 921.141 
(6) (Supp. 1976-1977). 
7 Tedder has not always been cited when the Florida Court has 
considered a judge-imposed death sentence followmg a jury recom-
mE>ndation of life imprisonment. See, e. g., Thompson v. State, 
328 So. 2d 1 (1976); Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (1976) ; 
Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (1976). But in the latter case 
two judges relied on Tedder in separate opmions, one in support 
of reversing the death sentence and one in support of affirmjng 1t. 
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[statutory] mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances." § 921.141 (a) (Supp. 1976·-
1977) .8 
The statute provides for automatic review by hte Su-
preme Court of Florida. of all cases in which a dea.th 
sentence has been imposed. § 921.141 ( 4) (Supp. 1976-
1977). The law differs from that of Georgia in that it does 
not require the court to conduct any specific form of re-
view. Since, however, the trial judge must justify the 
imposition of death sentence with written findings, mean-
ingful appellate review of each such sentence is made pos-
sible, and the Supreme Court of Florida, like its Georgia. 
counterpart, considers its function to be to "guarantee ... 
that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present in 
one case will reach a, similar result to that reached under 
similar circumstances in another case. . . . If a defend-
ant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case 
in light of the other decisions and determine whether or 
not the punishment is too great." State v. Dixon, 283 
So. 2d 1, 10 (1973). 
On their face these procedures, like those used in 
Georgia, appear to meet the constitutional deficiencies 
identified in Furman. The sentencing authority in 
8 In one case the Florida Court upheld a death sentence where 
the trial judge had simply listed six aggravating factors as justifica-
tion for the sentence he imposed. Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680 
(1975). Since there were no mitigating factors, and since some of 
these aggravating fa.ctors arguably fell within the statutory cate-
gories, it is unclear whether the Florida Court would uphold a 
dea.th sentence that rested entirely on nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstances. It seems unlikely that it would do so, since the 
capital-sentencing statute explicitly provides that "[a]ggravating 
circumstances shall be limited to tP.e following [eight specified 
factors.]." § 921.141 (5) (Supp. 1976-1977). (Emphasis added.) 
There is no such limiting language introducing the list of st11-tutory 
mitigating factors. See § 921.141 (6) (Supp. 1976-1977) . See also 
n. 14, infra. 
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Florida, the trial judge, is directed to weigh eight aggra· 
vating factors against seven mitigating factors to deter-
mine whether the death penalty shall be imposed. This 
determination requires the trial judge to focus on the 
circumstances of the crime and the character of the indi-
vidual defendant. He must, inter alia, consider whether 
the defendant has a prior criminal record, whether the 
defendant acted under duress or under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, whether the 
defendant's role in the crime was that of a minor accom-
plice, and whether the defendant's youth argues in favor 
of a more lenient sentence than might otherwise be 
imposed. The trial judge must ~lso determine whether 
the crime was committed in the course of one of several 
enumerated felonies, whether it was committed for 
pecuniary gain, whether it was committed to assist in 
an escape from custody or to prevent a lawful arrest, 
and whether the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel, To answer these questions, which are not un-
like those considered by a Georgia sentencing jury, com-
pare Gregg v. State, ante, p. 40, the sentencing judge 
must focus on the individual circumstances of each homi-
cide and each defendant. 
The basic difference between the Florida system and 
the Georgia system is that in Florida the sentence is 
determined by the tria.l judge rather than by the jury.9 
This Court has pointed out that jury sentencing in a 
capital case can perform an important societal function, 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 519 n. 15, but it 
9 Because the trial judge imposes sentence, the Florida court has 
ruled that he may order preparation of a presentence mvestigation 
report to assist him in determining the appropriate sentence. See 
Swan v. State, 322 So. 2d 485, 488-489 (1975) ; Songer v. State, 322 
So. 2d 481, 484 (1975). These reports frequPntly contain much 
mformation relevant to sentencing. See Gregg v. Georgia, ante, 
p. 32 n. 37. 
75-57~0PINION" 
PROFFITT v. FLORIDA 
has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitution-
ally required. And it would appear that judicial sentenc-
ing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in 
the imposition at the trial court level of capital punish-
ment, since a trial judge is more experienced in sentenc-
ing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose 
sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.' 0 
The Florida capital-sentencing procedures thus seek to 
a.ssure that the death penalty will not be imposed in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner. Moreover, to the extent 
that any risk to the contrary exists, it is minimized by 
Florida's appella.te· review system, under which the evi-
dence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is 
reviewed and reweighed by the Supreme Court of Florida 
"to determine independently whether the imposition of 
the ultimate penalty is warranted." Songer v. State, 322 
So. 2d 481 , 484 (1975). See also Sullivan v. State, 303. 
So. 2d 632, 637 (1974). The Supreme Court of Florida, 
like that of Georgia, has not hesitated to vacate a death 
sentence when it has determined that the sentence 
should not have been imposed. Indeed, it has vacated 
eight of the 21 death sentences that it has reviewed to 
date. See Taylor v. State, 294 So. 2d 648 (1974); La-
Madline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17 (1974); Slater v. State, 
316 So. 2d 539 (1974); Swan v. State, 322 So. 2d 485 
(1975); Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (1975); Halli-
10 See ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives & 
Proced-ures § 1.1 , Commentary, pp. 43-48; President 's Comm'n on 
Law Enforcement & Administration of Justice: The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society, Task Force Report: The Courts 26 (1967). 
See also Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. 51- 52. In the words of t heo 
Florida. Court, "a. trial judge with experience in the facts of 
criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to balance the facts of 
the case against the stand-ard criminal activity which can only be 
developed by involvement with the trials of numerous defendant::;."' 
&ate v. Dixon, 283 So. 20:, at 8. 
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weU v. State, 323 So. 2d 557 (1975); Thomp·son v. State, 
328 So. 2d 1 (1976); Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137· 
(1976). 
Under Florida's capital-sentencing procedures, in sum, 
trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to 
assist them in deciding whether to impose a death pen-
alty or imprisonment for life. Moreover, their decisions 
are reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with 
other sentences imposed in similar circumstances. Thus, 
in Florida, as in Georgia, it is no longer true that there 
is " 'no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases 
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many 
cases where it is not.'" Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. 31, 
quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 313 (WHITE, 
J., concurring). On its face the Florida system thus 
satisfies the constitutional deficiencies identified in 
Furman. 
B 
As in Gregg, the petitioner contends, however, that, 
while perhaps facially acceptable, the new sentencing· 
procedures in actual effect are merely cosmetic, and that 
arbitrariness and caprice still pervade the system under 
which Florida imposes the death penalty. 
(1) 
The petitioner first argues that arbitr:ariness is inherent 
in the Florida criminal justice system because it allows 
discretion to be exercised a.t each stage of a criminal 
proceeding-the prosecutor's decision whether to charge 
a capital offense in the first place, his decision whether 
to accept a plea to a lesser offense, the jury's considera-
tion of lesser included offenses, and, after conviction and 
unsuccessful appeal, the Executive's decision whether to 
commute a death sentence. As we noted in Gregg, this 
argument is based on a fundamental misinterpretation 
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of Furman, and we reject it for the reasons expressed in 
Gregg. See ante, pp. 41-42., 
(2) 
The petitioner next argues that the new Florida sen-
tencing procedures in re~lity do not eliminate the arbi-
trary infliction of death that was condemned in Furman. 
Basically he contends that the statutory aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances are vague and overbroad,11 and 
that the statute gives no guidance as to how the miti-
gating and aggravating circumstances should be weighed 
in any specific case. 
(a) 
Initially the petitioner asserts that the enumerated ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances are so vague and 
so broad that "virtually any first degree murder convict 
[is] a candidate for a death sentence." In particular, 
the petitioner att~cks the eighth and third statutory ag-
gravating circumstances, which authorize the death pen-
alty to be imposed if the crime ~s "especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel," or if " [ t] he defendant knowingly 
created a great risk of death to many persons." § 921.141 
(5)(h), (c) (Supp. 1976-1977). These provisions must 
be considered as they have been construed by the Su-
preme Court of Florida. 
That Court has recognized that while it is arguable 
"that all killings are atrocious, . . . [s]till we believe 
that the Legislature intended something 'especially' 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel when it authorized the death 
n As in Gregg, we examine the claims of vagueness and over-
breadth in the statutory criteria only insofar as it is necessary to 
determine whether there is a substantial risk that the Florida 
capital-sentencing system, when viewed in its entirety, will result 
in the capricious or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. See 
Gregg v. G'eorgta, ante, p. 43 n. 51. 
·." 
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penalty for first degree murder." T~dder v. State, 322 
So. 2d 908, 910 (1975). As a consequence, the Court 
has indicated that the eighth statutory provision is di-
rected only at "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which 
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon, 
283 So. 2d 1, 9 (1973). See also Alford v. State, 307 So. 
2d 433, 445 ( 1975); Halliwell v. State, 323 So. 2d 557, 
561 (1975.).12 We cannot say that the provision, as so 
construed, provides inadequate guidance to those charged 
with the duty of recommending or imposing sentences in 
capital cases. See Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. 43- 44. 
In the only case, exeept for the instant case, in which 
the third aggravating factor-"the defendant knowingly 
created a great risk of death to many persons"-was 
found, Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (1975), the State 
S;upreme Court held that the defendant created a great 
risk of death because he "obviously murdered two of the 
victims in order to avoid a surviving witness to the 
[firstl murder." 322 So. 2d, at 540.1 3 As construed by 
1. 2 The Supreme Court of Florida has affirmed death sentences in 
several cases, including the instant case, where this righth statutory 
aggravating factor was found , without specifica lly stating that the 
homicide was "pitiless" or "torturous to the victim." See, e. g., 
Hallman v. State , 305 So. 2d 180 (1974) (victim's throat slit with 
broken bottle) ; Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (1975) ("career 
criminal" shot sleeping traveling companion); Gardner v. State, 315 
So.2d 675 (1975) (brutal beating and murder ) ; Alvord v. State, 332 
So. 2d 533 (1975) (three women killed by strangulation, one raped); 
Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (1976) (depraved murder); Henry 
v. State, 328 So. 2d 430 (1976) (torture murder) ; Dobbert v. State, 
328 So. 2d 433 (1976) (torture and killing of two children). But 
the circumstances of aU of these cases could accurately be charac-
terized as "pitiless" and "unnecessarily tortuous," and it thus does 
not appear that the Florida Court has abandoned the definition 
that it announced in Dixon and applied in Alford, Tedder, and 
Halliwell. 
13 While it might be argued that this case broadens that construc-
tion, since only one person other than the victim was attacked at 
...... 
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the Supreme Court of Florida these provisions are not 
impermissibly vague.14 
(b) 
The petitioner next attacks the imprecision of the mit-
igating circumstances. He argues that whether a de-
fendant acted "under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance," whether a defendant's ca-
pacity "to conform .his conduct to the requirements of 
law was substantially impaired," or whether a defend-
ant's participation as an accomplice in a capital felony 
was "relatively minor," are questions beyond the capacity 
of a jury or judge to determine. See §§ 921.141 (6)(b), 
(f), (d) (Supp. 1970-1977). 
He also argues that neither a jury nor a judge is ca-
all and then only by being hit with a fist, this would be to read 
more into the State Supreme Court's opinion than is actually there. 
That Court considered 11 claims of error advanced by the peti-
tioner, including the trial judge's finding that none of the statutory 
mitigating circumstances existed. It did not, however, consider 
whether the findings as to each of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances were supported by the evidence. · If only one aggravat-
ing circmnstance had been found, or if some mitigating circumstance 
had been found to exist but not to outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances, we would be justified in concluding that the State Supreme 
Court had necessarily decided this point even though it bad not 
expressly done so. However, in the circumstances of this case, when 
four separate aggravating circumstances were found and where each 
mitigating circumstance was expressly found not to exist, no such 
holding on the part of the State Supreme Court can be implied. 
14 The petitioner notes further . that Florida's sentencing system 
fails to channel jury or judge discretion because it allows for con-
sideration of nonstatutory aggra.vating factors. In the only case 
to approve such a practice, Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680 (1975), 
the Florida Court recast the trial court's six nonstatutory aggravat-
ing factors into four aggravating circumstances-two of them statu-
tory. As noted earlier, it is unclear that the Florida Court wou)d 
ever approve a death sentence based entirely on nonstatutory aggra-
vating circumsta.nces. See n. 8, supra. 
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pable of deciding howe to weigh a defendant's a.ge or de~ 
termining whether he had a "significant history of prior 
criminal activity." See §§ 921.141 (6)(g), (a) (Supp. 
1976-1977), In a similar vein the petitioner argues 
that it is not possible to make a rational determination 
whether there are ''sufficient" aggravating circumstances 
that are not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances, 
since the state law assigns no specific weight to any of 
the various circumstances to be considered. See§ 921.141 
(Supp. 1976-1977). 
While these questions and decisions may be hard, 
they require no more line-drawing than is commonly re~ 
quired of a fact finder in a lawsuit. For example, juries 
have traditionally evaluated the validity of defenses such 
a.s insanity or reduced capacity, both of which involve 
the same considerations a.s some of the abpve-mentioned 
mitigating circumstances. While the various factors to 
be considered by the sentencing authorities do not have 
numerical weights a.ssigned to them, the requirements 
of Fu,rman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's 
discretion is guided and channeled by requiring examina-
tion of specific factors that argue in favor of or agaiqst 
imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total 
arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition. 
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida 
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the 
various aggravating circumstances to be weighed agaiqst 
the mitigating ones. As a result, the trial court's sen-
tencing discretion is guided and channeled by a system 
.that focuses on the citcumstances of each individual 
homicide and individu~tl defendant in deciding whether 
the death penalty is to be imposed. 
(c) 
Finally, the Florida statute ha.s a provision designed 
to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed 
... 
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~n a, capriciously selected group of convicted defendants, 
'fhe Supreme Court of Florida reviews each death sen .. 
tence to ensure that similar results are reached in sim, 
ilar cases.15 
Nonetheless the petitioner attacks the Florida appel .. 
late review process because the role of the Supreme 
Court of Florida in reviewing death sentences is neces.., 
sadly subjective and unpredictable. While it may be 
true that that Court has not chosen to formulate a rigid 
objective test as its standard of review for all cases, it 
does not follow that the appellate review process is in~ 
effective or arbitrary. In fact, it is apparent that the 
Florida Court has undertaken responsibly to perform its 
function of dea.th sentence review with a maximum of 
rationality and consistency. For example, it has sev~ 
eral times compared the circumstances of a case under 
review with those of previous cases in which it has a~­
sessed the imposition of death sentences. See, e. g., Al-
ford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433, 445 (1975); Alvord v. State, 
322 So. 2d 533, 540-541 (1975). By following this pro-
cedure the Florida Court has in effect adopted the type 
of proportionality review mandated by the Georgia stat-
ute. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. 47-49. And any 
suggestion that the Florida Court engages in only cursory 
or rubber stamp review of death penalty cases is to-
tally controverted by the fact that it has vacated over 
one-third of the dea.th sentences that have come before 
it. See pp. 9-10, supra.16 
15 State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d, at 10. 
16 The petitioner also argues that since the Florida Court does 
not review sentences of life imprisonment imposed in capital oases 
or sentences imposed in cases where a capital crime was charged 
but where the jury convicted of a lesser offense, it will have an 
unbalanced view of the way that the typical jury treats a murder 
case and it will affirm death sentences under circmnstances where 
the vast majority of judges would have imposed a sentence of life 
~ •.; .. 
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IV 
Florida, like Georgia, has responded to Furman by 
enacting legisla.tion that passes constitutional muster. 
That legislation provides that after a person is convicted 
.of first-degree murder, there shaH be an informed, 
focused, guided, and objective inquiry into the question 
whether he should be sentenced to death. If a death 
sentence is imposed, the sentencing authority articulates 
in writing the statutory reasons that led to its decision. 
Those reasons, and the evidence supporting them, are 
conscientiously reviewed by a court which, because of 
its statewide jurisdiction, can assure consistency, fairness, 
and rationality in the evenhanded o eration of the state 
law. As in Georgia, this system assurej; that sentences 
of death will not be "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed. 
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 310 (STEWART, J., 
concurring). Accordingly, the judgment before us is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
imprisonment. As we noted in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. 47 n. 56, 
this problem is not sufficient to raise a. serious risk tha.t, the state 
capital-sentencing system will result in arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of the death penalty, 
. '• · .. 
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In these cases, our primary responsibility was for 
Parts I, II, and III in No. 74-6257, Gregg v. Georgia. 
The development of the analysis for all five opinions, however, 
was a joint e ~fort of the Powe 11, Ste\.vart, and Stevens chambers. 
Justice Stewart ' s chambers took primary responsibility for 
Part IV of Gregg and Part III in the other four cases . Justice 
Stevens took primary responsibility for Part I in the four 
non-Gregg cases. Substantial editing was done by all 
three chambers on all parts of the five opinions . 
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NO. 75-5706, PROFFITT v. FLORIDA 
1S"Tt-,llJ:·J b 
Ci1.'cnLttuc.1: - - ------
Rut.;j 1·uuLJ.tcd : 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, 
and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS: 
The issue presented by this case is whether the im-
position of the sentence of death for the crime 
of murder under the law of Florida violates the Eighth and Four-
tee nth Amendments. 
I 
The petitioner, Charles William Proffitt, was tried, 
found guilty and sentenced to death for the first degree murder 
by stabbing of Joel MedgeQ.ow. The circumstances surrounding 
the murder itself were testified to by the decedent's wife, who 
1/ 
was present at the time of the murder. Mrs. Medgebow 
wakened around 5:00 a.m. to find her husband sitting up in bed, 
moaning. Just then a third person jumped up, hit her several 
times, knocked her to the floor, and then ran out of the house. 
Mrs. Medgebow was not able to identify the attacker, although she 
2/ 
was able to give a description of his clothing.-




The petitioner was connected to the crime as a result 
of a telephone call to the police made by his wife later in the 
morning of July 10. She testified that on the night before the 
murder, the petitioner had gone to work dressed in a short-
sleeved white shirt, with his company's name on it, and gray pants. 
He returned at about 5:15 a.m. dressed in the same shirt and 
pants but with no shoes. The petitioner had some conversation 
with his wife at this time, packed his clothes, and left. He 
was later arrested in Connecticut. 
A young woman who was boarding with the Proffitts 
overheard parts of the petitioner's conversation with his wife. 
The woman testified that the petitioner told his wife that he had 
stabbed and killed a man with a butcher knife while he was bur-
glarizing a place, and that he had beaten a woman. 
Small amounts of human blood were found on the 
petitioner's Maas Brothers shirt, but the quantity was too small 
for a determination of the blood type. No fingerprints were found 
on the murder weapon. 
One of the petitioner's co-worker's testified that they 
had been drinking together until 3:30 or 3:45 a.m., that the 
petitioner had driven him home, had conversed with him briefly, 
and left. The petitioner at this time was wearing the same gray 
pants and white shirt he wore back to his mobile home at 5:15 a.m. 
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The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. Sub-
3/ 
sequently, as provided by Florida law- a separate hearing was 
held to determine whether certain statutory aggravating circum-
stances surrounding the crime outweighed any statutory mitigating 
4/ 
circumstances found to exist- such that the petitioner should be 
sentenced to death rather than life imprisonment. At that hearing 
it was shown that the petitioner had one prior conviction, a 1967 
charge of breaking and entering without permission. The State 
also introduced the evidence of the doctor at the jail where the 
petiticner was held pending triaL The doctor testified that the 
petitioner had come to him as a physician, and told him that he 
(the petitioner) was concerned that he would do damage to other 
people in the future, that he had had an uncontrollable desire to 
kill which had resulted in his killing one man, that he could feel 
this desire building up again, and that he wanted the doctor to 
get him some psychiatric help so he would not kill again. The 
doctor also testified that in his opinion the petitioner was dangerous 
and would be a danger to his fellow inmates if imprisoned, but 
that the petitioner's condition could be treated so that he would 
no longer be dangerous. Dr. Crumbley also testified that in his 
opinion the petitioner was under an extreme mental disturbance 
at the time the crime was committed. 
. . 
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The jury returned an advisory verdict recommending 
that the sentence of death be imposed. The judge ordered an 
independent psychiatric evaluation of the petitioner, the results 
of which indicated that the petitioner was not, then or at the time 
of the murder, mentally impaired. The trial judge then sentenced 
the petitioner to death. In his written findings in support of the 
sentence, the judge found as aggravating circumstances (1) that 
the murder was premeditated and occurred in the course of a 
felony (burglary); (2) that the petitioner has the propensity to 
commit murder; (3) that the murder was especially heinous, atro-
cious, and cruel; and (4) that the petitioner knowingly through his 
intentional act created a great risk of serious bodily harm and 
death to many persons. The trial judge also specifically found 
that none of the enumerated mitigating circumstances existed in 
this case. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. Proffitt v. 
State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975). We granted certiorari, 
U.S. __ , to consider whether the imposition of the death 
sentence in this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 




The petitioner argues that the imposition of the death 
penalty under any circumstances is cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We reject 
this argument for the reasons stated today in Gregg v. Georgia, 
ante, pp. 14-43. 
III 
A 
In response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
the Florida l egislature adopted new statutes that authorize the 
imposition of the death penalty on those convicted of first-degree 
5/ 
murder, Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 782.04(1) (Supp. 1976-1977).- At 
the same time Florida adopted a new capital-sentencing procedure, 
patterned in large part on the Model Penal Code. See § 921.141 
6 I -
(Supp. 1976-1977).- Under the new statute, if a defendant is 
found guilty of a capital offense, a separate evidentiary hearing 
is held before the trial judge and jury to determine his sentence. 
Evidence may be presented on any matter the judge deems relevant 
to sentences and must include matters relating to certain legislatively 
specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Both the 
state and the defense may present argument on whether the death 
penalty shall be imposed. 
At the conclusion of the hearing the jury is directed 
to consider "[w ]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist . 
which outweigh aggravating circumstances found to exist, and ... 
[b ]ased on those considerations, whether the defendant should be 
sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
7/ 
921.141(2) (1976-1977 Supp. ).- The jury's verdict is determined 
by majority vote. It is only advisory; the actual sentence is 
determined by the trial judge. The Florida Supreme Court has 
stated, however, that "[i]n order to sustain a sentence of death 
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting 
a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually 
no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 
908, 910. Accord, Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1, 5. Cf. 
--- - 8 I 
Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666, 671.-
-
The trial judge is also directed to weigh the statutory 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances when he determines 
the sentence to be imposed on a defendant. The statute requires 
that if the trial court imposes a sentence of death, "it shall set 
forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is 
based as to the facts (a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating 
circumstances exist ... and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient 
[statutory] mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921. 141(3) 
9 I 
(1976-1977 Supp. ).-
The statute provides for automatic review by the 
Florida Supreme Court of all cases in which a death sentence has 
been imposed. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(4) (1976-1977 Supp. ). 
The statute differs from that of Georgia in that it does not re-
quire the court to conduct any specific form of review. Since, 
however, the trial judge must justify imposition of a death sen-
tence with written findings, meaningful appellate review of each 
such sentence is made possible, and the Florida Supreme Court, 
like its Georgia counterpart, considers its function to be to 
"guarantee ... that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons 
present in one case will reach a similar result to that reached 
under similar circumstances in another case .... If a de-
fendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case in 
light of the other decisions and determine whether or not the 
punishment is too great." State v . . Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 10(1973). 
- 8 -
On their face these procedures, like those used in 
Georgia, appear to meet the constitutional deficiencies, identified 
in Furman. The sentencing authority in Florida, the trial judge, 
is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven 
mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty should 
be imposed. This determination requires the trial judge to focus 
on the circumstances of the crime and the character of the 
individual. He must, inter alia, consider whether the defendant 
has a prior criminal record) 
whether the defendant acted under duress or 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
whether the defendant's role in the crime was that of a minor ac-
complice, and whether the defendant's youth argues in favor 
of a more lenient sentence than might otherwise be imposed upon 
him. The trial judge must also determine whether the crime was 
committed in the course of one of several enumerated felonies, 
whether it was committed for pecuniary gain, whether it was 
committed to assist in an escape from custody or to prevent a 
lawful arrest, and whether the crime was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel. To answer these questions, which are 
.. 
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not unlike those considered by a Georgia sentencing jury, compare 
Gregg v. Stat§ ante, pp. __ , the sentencing judge must focus 
on the individual circumstances of each homicide and each de-
fendant. 
The basic difference between the Florida system and 
that of Georgia is that in Florida the sentence is determined by 
_!_Q_/ 
the trial judge rather than by the jury. It would appear that 
this difference should lead, if anything, to an even greater con-
sistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punish-
ment in Florida than in Georgia, since a trial judge has much 
more experience in sentencing than does a jury and is therefore 
better able to impose sentences in line with those imposed in analogous 
11 I 
cases. 
These Florida Gapital-sentencing procedures thus seek 
to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed in an arbi-
trary or capricious manner. Moreover, to the extent that any 
risk to the contrary exists, it is minimized by Florida's appellate 
review system under which the evidence of the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances is reviewed and reweighed by the Florida 
Supreme Court "to determine independently whether the imposition 
- 10-
of the ultimate penalty is warranted." Songer v. State, 322 So. 
2d 481, 484. See also Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 680. The 
Florida Supreme Court, like that of Georgia, has not hesitated 
to vacate death sentences when it has determined that the sentence 
should not have been imposed. Indeed, it has vacated 8 of the 21 
death sentences that it has reviewed to date. See Taylor v. 
State, 294 So. 2d 648; LaMadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17; Slater 
v. State, 316 So.2d 539; Swan v. State, 322 So.2d 485; Tedder 
v. State, 322 So. 2d 908; Halliwell v. State, 323 So. 2d 557; 
Thompson v. State; 328 So. 2d 1, Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137. 
Under Florida's capital-sentencing procedure~ in sum, 
trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist them 
in deciding whether to impose capital punishment. Moreover, their 
decisions are reviewed to -ensure that they are consistent with 
other sentences imposed in similar circumstances. Thus, in 
Florida, as in Georgia, it is no longer true that there is " 'no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the ·few cases in which [the 
death penalty] is imposed from the many cases where it is not.' " 
Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. quoting Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 213, 313 (White, J., concurring). On its face the 
-------~------------~--------1 -
Florida system thus satisfies constitutional deficiencies identified 
in Furman. 
B 
As in Gregg, the petitioner contends, however, that, 
while perhaps facially acceptable, the new sentencing procedures 
are in actual effect merely cosmetic, and that arbitrariness and 
caprice still pervade the system under which Florida imposes 
the death penalty. 
(1) 
The petitioner first claims that arbitrariness is inherent 
in the Florida criminal justice system because it allows discretion 
to be exercised at each stage of a criminal proceeding -- the 
prosecutor's decision whether to charge a capital offense in the 
first place, his decision whether to accept a plea to a lesser 
-
offense, the jury's consideration of lesser included offenses, and, 
after conviction and unsuccessful appeal, the executive's decision 
whether to commute a death sentence. As we noted in Gregg, 
this argument is based on a fundamental misinterpretation of 
Furman, and we reject it for the reasons expressed in Gregg. 
See ante, pp. b)-.'; . 
- 12-
(2) 
The petitioner next argues that the new Florida sentencing 
procedures in reality do not eliminate the arbitrary infliction of 
death that was condemned in Furman. Basically he contends 
that the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are 
12/ 
vague and overbroad- and that the statute gives no guidance 
as to how the mitigating and aggravating circumstances should 
be weighed in any specific case. 
(a) 
Initially the petitioner asserts that the enumerated 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are so vague and so 
broad that "virtually any first degree murder convict [is] a 
candidate for a death sentence." In particular, it is argued, 
the eighth statutory aggravating circumstance which authorizes 
the death penalty to be imposed if the crime is "especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel," is intolerably vague and overbroad. Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5)(h) (Supp. 1976-1977). The Florida 
Supreme Court has recognized, however, that while it is arguable 
"that all killings are atrocious, . . . [ s ]till we believe that the 
Legislature intended something 'especially' heinous, atrocious 
or .cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree 




consequence, the Court has indicated that this provision is directed 
only at "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (1973). 
See also Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433, 445 (1975 ); Halliwell v. 
13/ 
State, 323 So. 2d 557, 561 (1975).- As so construed, we cannot 
say that the provision provides inadequate guidance to those 
charged with the duty of recommending or imposing sentences in 
capital cases. See Greggv. Georgia, ante, pp. 63-64. 
The petitioner also c.laims that the third statutory 
aggravating factor -- "[t]he defendant knowingly created a great 
risk of ,death to many persons" -- is vague. In Dixon the Florida 
Court indicated "that a man of ordinary intelligence and knowledge 
easily conceives the concepts involved" in determining whether 
this statutory aggravating -circumstance exists. 283 So. 2d, at 
9. The only case in which this third aggravating factor was 
found, except for the instant case, was Alvord v. State, 3 22 So. 2d 
533 (1975 ), where the State Supreme Court found that the defendant 
created a great risk of death because he "obviously murdered two 
of the victims in order to avoid a surviving witness to the [first] 
T::>- ::n oo, P rolTU 
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murder." 322 So. 2d, at 540. In the present case this aggravating 
circumstance was found, although the defendant attacked only one 
person other than his murder victim. While as an original matter 
we might not so construe the word "many, " we cannot say that the 
14/ 
state courts acted unconstitutionally in doing so. 
(b) 
The petitioner next attacks the impreciseness of the 
mitigating circumstances. He argues that whether a defendant 
acted "undor the influence of extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance," whether a defendant's capacity "to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law was seriously impaired, " or whether 
a defendant's participation as an accomplice in a capital felony 
was "relatively minor,." are questions beyond the capacity of a 
jury or judge to determine. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § § 921.141(6)(b), 
(f), (d) (Supp. 1976-1977). 
He also argues that neither a jury nor a judge is cap-
able of deciding how to weigh a defendant's age or to determine 
whether he had a "significant history of prior criminal activity." 
See § § 921.141(6)(g), (a) (Supp. 1976-1977). In a similar vein 
the petitioner argues that it is not possible to make a rational 
determination whether there are "sufficient" aggravating cir-
cumstances which are not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances, 
- 15 -
since the state law assigns no specific weight to any of the various 
circumstances to be considered. See § 921.141(2) (Supp. 1976-
1977). 
While these questions and decisions may be hard, they 
require no more line-drawing or hair-splitting than is commonly 
required of a fact finder in a lawsuit. For example, juries have 
traditionally decided the validity of defenses such as insanity 
or reduced capacity, both of which involve the same considera-
tions as some of the above-mentioned mitigating circumstances. 
Wh.ile the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities 
do not have numerical weights assigned to them, the requirements 
of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion 
is guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors 
that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, 
thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its 
imposition. 
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida 
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the various 
aggravating circumstances to be weighed against the mitigating 
ones. As a result the trial court's sentencing discretion is guided 
and channeled by a system that focuses on the circumstances of 
each individual homicide and individual defendant in deciding 
whether the death penalty is to be imposed. 
. .... 
. , 
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(c) 
But even if it were accepted that one or more of the 
statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances is somewhat 
vague or overbroad, this alone would not render the Florida 
capital-sentencing procedure unconstitutional so long as there 
existed some other safeguard to prevent imposition of the death 
penalty on a capriciously selected group of convicted defendants. 
Florida law has just such a safeguard in its provision for review 
by the Florida Supreme Court of each. death sentence to ensure 1 · 9 IP V~uN 
"that the reasons present in one case will reach a result similar c~e..d ~ 
15 I 
to that reached under similar circumstances in another case."-
Nonetheless the petitioner attacks the Florida appellate 
review process because the role of the Florida Supreme Court in 
reviewing death sentences _is necessarily subjective and unpre-
dictable. While it may be true that that Court has not chosen to 
formulate an unvarying objective test as its standard of review 
for all cases, it does not follow that the appellate review process 
is ineffective or arbitrary. In fact, it is apparent that the Florida 
::;---- -----------Court has responsibly undertake to perform its function of death 
sentence review with a maximum of rationality and consistency . 
For example, it has several times compared the circum-
stances of a case under review with those of other previous cases 
in which it has assessed the imposition of death sentences. See, 
e.g., Alford v. State, 307 So.2d 433, 445 (1975); Alvord v. State, 
322 So. 2d 533, 540-541 (1975). By following this procedure 
the Florida Court has in effect adopted the type of proportionality 
review mandated by the Georgia statute. Compare Gregg v. 
Georgia, ante, pp. 67-71. And any suggestion that the Florida 
Court engages in only cursory or rubber stamp review of death 
penalty cases is totally controverted by the fact it has vacated 
over one-third of the death sentences that have come before it. 
16/ 
Seep. 10, supra. 
IV 
Florida, like Georgia, has enacted legislation in response 
to Furman that passes con:stitutional muster. That legislation 
provides that after a person is convicted of first degree murder, 
there shall be an informed, focused, guided, and objective inquiry 
into the question whether he should be sentenced to death. If a 
death sentence is imposed, the sentencing authority articulates 
in writing the statutory reasons that led to its decision. Those 
reasons, and the evidence supporting them, are conscientiously 
reviewed by a court which because of its statewise jurisdiction 
It' r" 
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can assure consistency, fairness, and rationality in the even-
handed operation of the state law. As in Georgia, this system 
assures that sentences of death will not be "wantonly" or "freakishly" 
imposed. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 310 (Stewart, 
J., concurring). Accordingly, the judgment before us is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
FOOTNOTES 
_!_/ 
The murder occurred on July 10, 1973. 
2/ 
She described the attacker as wearing light pants 
and a pin stripe shirt with long sleeves rolled up to the elbow. 
She also stated that the attacker was a medium-sized male. 
3/ 
Seep. __ , infra. 
4/ 
-Seep. __ , infra. 
5/ 
The murder statute under which petitioner was 
convicted reads as follows: 
"(1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being when 
perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the 
death of the person killed or any human being, or when 
committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, 
or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, 
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the 
unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive 
device or bomb, or which resulted from the unlawful 
distribution of heroin by a person over the age of seven-
teen years when such drug is proven to be the proximate 
cause of death of the user, shall be murder in the first 
degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable 
as provided in§ 775.082. 
Fn-2 
(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure 
set forth in section 921.141 shall be followed in order 
to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment." 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 (1973). 
Another Florida statute authorizes imposition of the 
death penalty upon conviction of sexual battery of a child under 
twelve years of age. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794. 011(2) (Supp. 1976-
1977). We do not in this opinion consider the constitutionality 
of the death penalty for any offense other than first-degree murder. 
6/ 
- Compare Model Penal Code § 210. 6 (Proposed 
Official Draft, 1962) (set out in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, at p. __ , 
n. 42). 
\ 
The aggravating circumstances are: 
"(a) The capital felony was committed by a person 
under sentence of imprisonment. 
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another 
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to the person. 
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of 
death to many persons. 
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant 
was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission 
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing 
or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, 
burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful 
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive 
device or bomb. 
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose 
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting 




(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. 
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or 
hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function 
or the enforcement of laws. 
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel." 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5) (Supp. 1976-1977). 
The mitigating circumstances are: 
"(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal activity. 
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defend-
ant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance. 
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's 
conduct or consented to the act. 
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital 
felony committed by another person and his participation 
was relatively minor. 
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under 
the substantial domination of another person. 
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime." 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6) (Supp. 1976-1977). 
8/ 
- Tedder has not always been cited when the Florida 
Court has considered a judge-imposed death sentence following a 
jury recommendation of life imprisonment. See, e.g., Thoml!son 
v. Sta!~, 328 So.2d 1 (1976); Douglas v. State, 328 So.2d 18 
(1976~ _Dobpert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (1976). _But in the latter case, two juc 
relied on :r~dde:r in s eparate opinions, one in support of reversing 
the death sentence and one in support of affirming it. 
-----------~-------------------FN-~ 
9/ 
-In one case the Florida Court upheld a death sentence 
where the trial judge had simply listed six aggravating factors as 
justification for the sentence he imposed. Sawyer v. State, 313 
So.2d 680 (1975). Since there were no mitigating factors, and 
since some of these aggravating factors arguably fell within the 
statutory categories, it is unclear whether the Florida Court would 
uphold a death sentence that rested entirely on nonstatutory aggra-
vating circumstances. It seems unlikely that it would do so, since 
the capital-sentencing statute explicitly provides that "[a]ggravating 
circumstances shall be limited to the following [eight specified 
factors.]." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5) (Supp. 1976-1977). 
(emphasis added). There is no such limiting language introducing 
the list of statutory mitigating factors. See § 921.141 (6) (Supp. 
1976-1977). See also n. 1"4 infra. 
10/ 
- Because the trial judge imposes sentence, the 
Florida court has ruled that he may order preparation of a pre-
sentence investigation report to assist him in determining the 
appropriate sentence. See Swan v. State, 322 So.2d 485, 488-
489 (1975 ); Songer v. State, 3 22 So. 2d 481, 484 (1975). These 
reports, of course, contain much information relevant to sen-
tencing. See Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. __ , n. 35. 
. ·.~ .. 
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See ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alterna-
tives & Procedures § 1.1(b), Commentary, pp. 45-46; President's 
Commn. on Law Enforcement & Administration of Justice: The 
Challenge of Crime in a .Free Society, Task Force Report: The 
Courts, 26 (1967). See also Gregg v. Georgia2 ante, pp. 51-52, 
In the words of the Florida Court, "[A] trial judge with experience 
in the facts of criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to 
balance the facts of the case against the standard criminal activity 
which can only be developed by involvement with the trials 
of numerous defendants." State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d, at 8. 
B_/ 
As in _Qregg.z. we examine the claims of vagueness 
and overbreadth in the statutory criteria only i.ns!Jfar as it is 
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial ris~ that 
the Florida capital-sentencing; system, whe:.1 vie-..ved in its en-
tirety, will resu,.t in the randJm and arbitrary imposition of the 
n. 50. 
13 I 
-- The Florida S:1p:re~e Court has affirmed death 
sente:.1ces i.n several cas.8s, in~ludin,5 the instant case, where 
this eighth statutorJ aggravating factor was found, without specifically 
~~---------------~~·N- . 
stating that th= homicide was "pitiless" or "torturous to the vic -
tim." See,~_:~, Hallman v. Sta~ 305 So. 2d 180 (1974) (victim's 
throat slit with broken bottle); Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 
666 (1975) ("career criminal" shot sleeping traveling companion); 
Gardner v. _§tate, 313 So. 2d 675 (1975) (brutal beating and murder); 
Alvord v. --~tate, 3 22 So. 2d 533 (1975) (three women killed by 
strangulation, one raped); Do~tgla~ v. £)tate, 328 So. 2d 18 (1976) 
(depraved murder); He~n·y v. Sta!~..L 328 So. 2d 430 (1976) (torture 
murder); Dobber_t. v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (1076) (torture and 
killing of two children). But the circumstances of all of these 
cases could accurately be characterized as "pitiless" and "un-
necessarily torturous, " and it thus does not appear that the Florida 
Court has abandoned the definition that it announced in D xon and 
14/ 
- The petitioner notes further that Florida's sentencing 
system fails to channel jury or judge discretion because it allows 
for consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors. In the only 
case to approve such a practice, Sawyer v. Stat~ 313 So. 2d 68 0 
(1975 ), the Florida Court recast the trial court's six nonstatutory 
aggravating factors into four aggravating circumstances -- two of 
them statutory. As noted earlier, it is unclear that the Florida 
•·' 
Court would ever approve a death sentence based entirely on non-
statutory aggravating circumstances. See n. 9, supra. 
15 I 
- State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d, at 10. 
16/ 
-- The petitioner also argues that since the Florida 
Court does not review sentences of life imprisonment imposed in 
capital cases or sentences imposed in cases where a capital crime 
was charged but where the jury convicted of a lesser offense, it 
will have an unbalanced view of the way that the typical jury 
treates a murder case and it will affirm death sentences under 
circumstances where the vast majority of juries would have re-
turned a verdict of life hnprisonment. As we noted in Gregg v. 
Georgia, ante, p. __ , n. 55, this problem is not sufficient to 
raise a serious risk that the state capital-sentencing system will 
result in arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. 
. . ,. 
